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I Introduction
The purpose of this article is to analyse how
Brazilian elites view poverty and social inequality
and to offer some preliminary comparisons with
Bangladesh and South Africa (this volume). My own
research began a few years ago and was originally
inspired by the revealing studïes of Sidney Verba
and his associates about elite views in the United
States, Sweden and Japan (Verba et al. 1987).
Concerned about the issue of poverty and intrigued
by the extreme inequality that characterises
Brazilian society, I set myself the task of identifying
the elite's cognitive and evaluative perceptions of
such issues. Together with a small group of col-
leagues, in 1993-94, I conducted a broader survey
on the political culture of four elite sectors in Brazil:
top state technocrats/bureaucrats, members of the
National Congress, top business leaders, and union
leaders (Reis and Cheibub 1995, 1996).
Later on, through contacts with the Comparative
Research Programme on Poverty (CROP), it
became possible to expand the Brazilian project,
making it comparative to studies of elites in other
less-developed societies.' Through CROP, I entered
into contact with De Swaan, Manor and Oyen, and
together we established a plan to investigate the
views on poverty held by several elite sectors.
Inspired by the work of De Swaan (1988) on the
origins of welfare policies in Europe, we wrote a
paper that has served as our common theoretical
understanding and that has in a way guided the
individual country studies now underway (De
Swaan et al. 1998).
Naturally, each of the national studies has its own
peculiarities, reflecting not only the objective con-
ditions of the elites' physical setting but also the
research commitments of each one of us. However,
apart from the shared theoretical background men-
tioned above, we also agreed upon the types of elite
sectors to be interviewed and upon a general set of
questions to be investigated.
In my view, this joint enterprise constitutes a good
example of what collaborative research can
achieve. While preserving our freedom to explore
The home page address for the Research Network of
the International Social Science Council is
www.crop.org.
127
particular questions, we have established the com-
mon conditions needed to compare across coun-
tries. Comparison constitutes the social sciences'
best proxy for laboratory conditions. By comparing
national elites, perhaps we can better understand
the supply of social policies and be able to tackle
some of its limitations in counteracting poverty
In what follows, I first comment on the magnitude
and main characteristics of poverty in Brazil. I then
describe how the elites view the problem both in
cognitive and normative terms. For this purpose, I
use information provided by my previous survey
research, as well as by in-depth interviews I am cur-
rently conducting. My research material also
includes a large sample of articles signed by mem-
bers of the elite in some of the most important
Brazilian newspapers.2 Finally, in the third section, 1
call attention to major convergences and divergences
in the perceptions of the Brazilian elites and those of
the elites in Bangladesh and South Africa. Despite
the preliminary nature of this comparative exercise,
it allows me the opportunity to reflect briefly on the
relationships between values and beliefs, on the one
hand, and concrete interests, on the other.
2 Poverty and Inequality in Brazil
What proportion of the Brazilian population is
poor? According to official statistics for 1990,
around 30% of the total population, or 42,000,000
people, can be deemed poor, while those living in
extreme poverty totaled 12%, or 16,600, 000
(Rocha 1995). Poverty is more acute in the coun-
tryside, where 70.5% of families live below the
poverty line - defined as a per capita income less
than half the legal minimum wage, which is around
US$110 per month (IPEA 1992). We also know
that poverty is more severe among blacks than
whites, hits females harder than males, and is more
widespread among those living in the northeast
than those in southern and southeast Brazil. As has
been often mentioned, if you are a black female liv-
ing in the rural northeast of Brazil, you have a 95%
chance of being poor.
However, the large majority of the poor live in urban
areas. Rocha (1995) estimated that more than two
thirds of the Brazilian poor reside in urban centres.
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Even in the less urbanised northeast, the absolute
number of poor people is much higher in urban
areas, a fact that reflects the country high rates of
urbanisation in recent decades. As indicated in
Figure I, in 1996 slightly more than one fifth of the
population lived in the countryside, a sharp contrast
to the situation in the early sixties when more than
half of Brazilians were rural. Official data for 1996
indicate that 78.4% of the population lives in urban
areas. There are, however, significant variations
across regions: while in the wealthier southeast close
to 90% of the population is urban, the figure for the
northeast is 65.2% (IBGE 1996).
The demographic trends described above are part
and parcel of many important changes in economic
and social conditions, changes that put heavy pres-
sure on the supply of public goods and services,
and that make the exclusionary nature of the mod-
ernisation process much more visible. The weight
of the informal sector has grown persistently, as
evinced by the fact that in 1990-91 there were
23,000,000 urban workers in informal activities,
and 4,000,000 unemployed.
If we opt to include criteria in addition to income,
the portrait of the human development process
does not get much better. Looking at education, we
observe that Brazilians have 5.3 years of schooling
on the average, a very low figure compared to coun-
tries of similar economic performance (IBGE 1996).
The proportion of illiterates among those who are
15 or older is 14.7%, but in the northeast it reaches
28.7%. Infant mortality rates are also higher in
Brazil than in countries of its own income group
and even than much poorer societies: 44 per 1,000
in 1997.
Taking rates of violence into account as another
indicator of a country welfare level, we observe
that Brazil ranks very poorly: based on death cer-
tificates, health ministry data for 1995 indicate
there were 24.1 homicides per 1,000 inhabitants.
The data in Table 1 help us place that figure into
comparative perspective. We can infer from it that
the Brazilian figure is high even when compared to
the average for the whole group of developing
countries.
The sample of press articles on poverty and inequality newspapers of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and
signed by elite persons was drawn from the two largest Portaleza.
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Table 1: Average violence rates by groups of countries
Source: Kahn (1998)
As has been observed, the high levels of violence in
Latin America express a combination of factors,
which include fast modernisation, rapid social dis-
location, social anomie, poverty, extreme inequali-
ties, and a political tradition of authoritarianism.
Even if we leave aside the controversial idea that
poverty causes violence, there is reliable evidence in
the Brazilian case that the poor are more vulnerable
to violence: criminality rates are much higher in
poor neighborhoods, as has been observed by
researchers in this area.
While poverty is a serious problem in Brazil, it is
critical to observe that the country as such cannot
be considered 'poor' according to standard eco-
nomic indicators, Thus, taking into account aggre-
gate national income, Brazil is among the 20% of
wealthier countries in the world, with a per capita
Figure 1: Brazil: urban and rural population, 1940-96
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GDP of US$ 5,037.13 (Scalon, forthcoming). What
makes its poverty problem particularly acute are the
immense disparities one finds between social
groups. This makes the poverty problem as much a
social as an economic puzzle. The data in Table 2
put into comparative perspective the degree of
inequality prevailing in Brazil. In recent years the
country has disputed the position of being the most
unequal society in the world; its competitors are
Botswana, South Africa and Sierra Leone.
Contrary to expectations, modernisation and eco-
nomic growth did not reduce the gap between rich
and poor in Brazil. As Table 3 shows, the Gini index
for 1960 already indicated a high degree of social
inequality, but this grew persistently thereafter,
regardless of the ups and downs in GDP growth
rates. The growth of inequality in recent Brazilian
Group Homicides per 1,000 Inhabitants No. of Countries
Less developed 4.2 14
Developing 12.7 52
Industrialised 4.7 42
All Countries 8.5 108
Table 2: Ratio of incomes of top 10% and bottom 40% of distribution in selected countries
Source: United Nations (1991)
history is even more dramatically illustrated when
we look instead at the ratio between the income of
the top 10% and bottom 10% of the income pyra-
mid.
Inequality is a very salient issue in Brazil, as may be
deduced from its recurrence in the media. After 20
years of military rule, the initial stages of the transi-
tion to democracy brought to light strong demands
'to redeem the social debt', a common expression in
the mid-eighties. The first ten years of re-democra-
tisation (1985-94) saw much progressive social leg-
islation and talk of lending true meaning to the
term 'citizenship rights', but a close look reveals
that little was achieved in reducing poverty and
inequality High inflation rates acted as regressive
taxation, neutralising any gains accruing to poor
sectors.
In the last four years, the government has directed
all of its energies to halting inflation. Success has
helped alleviate poverty Consumption of basic food
staples increased considerably, indicating that sim-
ply preserving the low income level of the poor was
Table 3: Evolution of income inequality, 1960-90
Source: Barros and Mendonca (1995)
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a strong anti-poverty mechanism. But no progress
was made as regards inequality levels, which
increased. The high interest rates maintained to
attract foreign capital favoured upper social eche-
lons in particular, since they could opt for financial
investments.
Poverty alleviation helped the incumbent presi-
dent secure an easy re-election, but there are seri-
ous indications that the economic strategy
adopted to curb inflation has reached a dead-end.
On top of aggravated unequal distribution, one
now sees inflation coming back while economic
recession is growing ever more severe, pushing
unemployment to unprecedented levels. In this
negative context, the extremes of the social pyra-
mid are moving farther and farther apart, while
the middle classes are likely to move closer to the
bottom. This may aggravate the isolation of the
elites and eventually prompt unexpected changes
in politics and policies.
Of course, there are serious technical constraints
that make economic redistribution a complex issue.
Country Proportion Country Proportion
Latin America Industrialised
Brazil 5.8 Australia 1.6
Colombia 2.8 Canada 1.3
Venezuela 2.4 Denmark 1.3
Africa Italy 1.3
Botswana 4.8 United States 1.6
Ghana 1.7 Asia
Ivory Coast 2.8 Malaysia 2.5
India 1.4
Bangladesh 1.1
1960 0.50 34
1970 0.56 40
1980 0.59 47
1990 0.60 78
Year Gini Index '0+/lo-
However, the realisation that there is enough wealth
to overcome severe poverty is at once hopeful and
disconcerting. It at first suggests that, since the
means are in principle available, one must count on
good, willing elites for a successful programme to
eradicate poverty A second thought suggests that
the scale of ongoing inequalities is such that the
rich do not feel responsible for those living in utter
poverty An overly wide gap between social
extremes does not permit a sense of generalised
social community (Reis 1998). Rather, we may find
a situation where social responsibility shrinks
among those who could either engage themselves in
the fight against poverty or else provide the support
needed for public action. In any case, it remains
critical to take into account that what the elites
think about social deprivation and about the pat-
terns of distribution prevailing in their milieu are
important issues when we address poverty and
inequality problems.
3 Elite Views
Whether they are moved by charitable concerns, by
fear of individual or collective violence, or by profit
considerations that demand better workers and
more consumers, the truth is that the way elites
look at poverty and inequality is a key indicator to
the likelihood that effective anti-poverty initiatives
will be undertaken in any society Whether mea-
sures will be taken to ameliorate the lot of the poor
depends upon the willingness of those who control
available resources.
To say that the elites do matter is not to deny that
pressures from below are important. The elites' atti-
tudes and behaviour often constitute a response to
such pressures. In any case, short of revolutionary
situations, the established elites necessarily play a key
role in supporting and/or implementing actions or
inactions vis-à-vis poverty
To say that elites affect policy decisions is not to say
that every member of the elite is a decision-maker.
Some do indeed act in that capacity but others are
relevant because they influence decision-makers,
form public opinion, have the means to act in
order to make policies effective, etc. Moreover, the
various sectors of the elite may have different per-
ceptions of poverty and inequality, and some
groups with atypical views could play a role in
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shaping distribution patterns. This suggests that
research efforts to compare the views of different
elite sectors may contribute to our knowledge of
how to devise more effective policies. Right now,
however, I will concentrate on the typical views of
Brazilian elites, as do my colleagues who analyse
elites in Bangladesh and South Africa.
There is indeed a large margin of agreement among
the various elite sectors in Brazil, as indicated by my
random sample and well illustrated by the in-depth
interviews. Notwithstanding the fact that the insti-
tutional position which the individual occupies
plays a distinctive role in shaping their perceptions,
there is indeed a wide margin of agreement across
sectors, making for a well-identifiable core of com-
mon views. In short, it is possible to say that elites
share common values, norms, and opinions on key
social issues. In this sense, summarising the major
conclusions of my survey research, I would say that:
The elite confers a high priority to social prob-
lems. Answering questions framed in various
ways, the respondents always ranked poverty,
inequality, poor housing, health, and educa-
tional conditions among the country's major
problems. With the exception of inflation rates,
which at the time reached three digits per
annum, social problems were always placed at
the top, whether the question posed was open
or closed. No matter what elite sector the indi-
vidual belonged to, he (there were no women in
the elite sample!) would rank issues of social
policy before economic and political problems.
Regardless of the elite sector, everybody favours
investments in education as the best way to
fight poverty and reduce inequality One could
speak of a national elite consensus on the prior-
ity of education as a policy target.
Other top concerns in the discourse of the elites
were land redistribution and investments in pub-
lic health. The first point deserves a closer look
as landless people have long been mobilised in
the most active social movement in the country,
while at the same time efforts to pass agrarian
reform laws have persistently failed.
There are indications that what lies behind the
preference for agrarian reform is the optimistic
expectation that land redistribution would
improve living conditions in the large cities
where the elite lives. They appear to have a
dream of exporting the poor to the countryside,
where they could not only produce for their
own consumption but even generate a mar-
ketable surplus.
Consistent with the previous observation was
the fact that respondents would systematically
mention high criminality rates and pressure on
the provision of public goods in large cities as
the major consequences of poverty and inequal-
ity They would blame poverty and inequality
for the lack of personal security, dirty and dan-
gerous public spaces, and related problems.
The different elite sectors conferred priority to
voluntaristic factors as major explanations for
the failure of public policy in addressing
inequality issues in Brazil. In the elites' view,
lack of political will is the first reason why
social policies fail. Next come bad planning and
bureaucratic inefficiency, which are also factors
blamed on the actors rather than on structural
constraints.
If the elites in Brazil place poverty and inequal-
ity as leading problems facing the country and
if they allegedly experience extreme inequality
as embarrassing, they tend to confer upon the
state all the blame for the persistence of such
problems. The elite do not feel responsible for
changing the picture, not even when they act
inside the state as top bureaucrats or politi-
cians. The state that they reproach for not tak-
ing action is an abstraction, not the set of
institutions in which they themselves often
operate.
But if in the elites' view the state has not dis-
played the required political will to do its job,
they are not prepared to confer upon civil soci-
ety the role of fighting poverty and inequality
With the exception of religious leaders, the
elites tend to be skeptical about the contribu-
tion of NGOs and non-state actors in general in
dealing with poverty problems.
The qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews is at
a veiy preliminary stage. To compensate for that I have
also used the information available from the sample of
132
The above findings have been widely corroborated
in the in-depth interviews recently conducted.3
While I have focused my research on elites active
either at the federal level or in four large state capi-
tal cities (Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the centre
south and Salvador and Fortaleza in the northeast),
the various elite sectors living in different parts of
the country tend to converge when it comes to their
cognitive and evaluative opinions about poverty,
inequality, and preferred ways of coping with such
issues. It is curious how the answers to the survey
questionnaire and the opinions expressed in the
unstructured interviews are similar. This suggests to
me that there is a consensus ideology about poverty
and inequality among the elites. In Gramscian
terms, one could say there is a hegemonic view of
the problem (Gramsci 1966). Within the 'orthodox'
view, everyone agrees that inequality is too high;
that something must be done; that education is the
best channel for lifting people out of poverty
The picture sketched above is an intriguing one.
For one thing, we deal with an elite very sensitive to
the social inequality prevailing in its own society
An elite that feels threatened by the consequences
of social exclusion and blames a lack of political will
for the 'dangerous' status quo but who nevertheless
does not feel responsible for changing things. Such
findings draw a very different picture from the one
De Swaan shows for European elites, who in the
past ended up seeing welfare policies as the most
adequate way of coping with the negative external-
ities of poverty (De Swaan 1988). Will the compar-
ison with other national elites today reveal Brazilian
elites to be closer to their contemporaries? The next
topic addresses this comparison.
4 Comparing Elite Views Across
Continents
If I had to make just one single statement based on
the comparison of the three national elites exam-
ined in this'issue, I would say that in general
Brazilian elites seem closer to their South African
counterparts than to the Bangladeshi elites. In many
ways, it is possible to see that in the former coun-
tries those who control most of the resources share
some common perceptions with regards to poverty
newspapers articles. For statistical analysis of the
findings commented here see Reis and Cheibub (1995,
1997).
and inequality Yet there are significant differences
in their views as well, as there are commonalities
that the elites of Bangladesh do share with those in
Brazil and/or South Africa.
As in South Africa, the elites in Brazil tend to con-
fer prïority to economic policy issues over social
policy They would like to contend that, when the
'national cake grows', everybody gets a piece. In
both cases, the normative expectation is that the
state would do better by creating greater opportuni-
ties for the private sector to generate more wealth,
which, they argue, naturally trickles down to the
less privileged. Realism, though, makes elites in
both countries recognise that impressive develop-
ment rates are not likely in the near future. So they
are compelled to think of alternatives.
The elites in both countries place responsibility for
alleviating poverty mainly upon the state. If they
believe economic growth is the best way to fight
poverty, the elites tend to think of the state, not of
civil society, as the natural provider of short-term,
emergency initiatives. Even if they do not reject vol-
untary initiatives, in normative terms they see pub-
lic authority as the legitimate actor responsible for
implementing social policies. Their skepticism with
regards to non-governmental actors contrasts
sharply with the view of the elites in Bangladesh
who, as reported by Hossain and Moore, clearly
trust voluntary initiative over government action as
the most efficient anti-poverty alternative.
Actually, even if not always explicitly, it seems that
in these three national cases, the preference for state
or civil society initiatives mixes normative and cog-
nitive concerns. That is to say, whatever the
revealed preference, it is justified both in ideologi-
cal and pragmatic terms. Thus, elites in Brazil tend
to perceive non-governmental action as uncoordi-
nated, inefficient, and irregular. Furthermore, they
attribute to public authority the moral duty to do
something against poverty
One could perhaps suggest that the difference
between Brazil and South Africa, on the one hand,
and Bangladesh, on the other, reflects the degree of
stateness in their respective societies. While the for-
mer have long lived with solid state structures,
sharply differentiated from civil society, in the latter
the relative newness of the state, coupled with a
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religious tradition that does not separate private
from public responsibilities, contributes to the pos-
itive evaluation of philanthropic initiatives and of
NGOs. Further investigation will be needed to vali-
date this line of interpretation.
While Brazil and South Africa are both highly
unequal societies with income differentials among
the largest in the world, it is interesting to observe
that the Brazilian elites seem to be much more
aware of this fact than their South African counter-
parts. The latter, as observed by Kalati and Manor in
this volume, tend to play down South Africa rates
of inequality, always mentioning there are countries
like Brazil and India that are more unequal than
their own society Brazilians instead always refer to
Brazil's shameful leadership when it comes to social
inequality, and the expression 'social apartheid' to
refer to the prevailing patterns of social exclusion is
common sense in their discourse.
Perhaps because they live with so much inequality,
elites in Brazil and South Africa are very fearful of
the consequences poverty may have on their per-
sonal safety Unlike their Bangladeshi counterpart,
who tends to see the poor as the repository of social
morality, the other two cannot help but feel their
personal security threatened by high urban crimi-
nality
However, while in the European past the 'great fear'
the elites felt in relation to the lower classes con-
tributed to the adoption of collective measures
against poverty the reaction in the two national
cases referred to here is quite different. Elites in
Brazil and in South Africa like to believe that life in
rural areas is much less harsh for the poor. Ignoring
rural poverty as they do in South Africa, or idealis-
ing a non-existent agrarian reform as in Brazil, these
national elites seem to prefer to remove the threat-
ening poor from their surroundings rather than
back social policies to improve the lot of the socially
excluded within their surroundings. Once again,
the contrast with the discourse of the elites in
Bangladesh is striking, but likewise noticeable is the
fact that the latter do not face the high urban crim-
inality rates afflicting other two.
While in the three national studies, education is
perceived as the best channel for overcoming
poverty, it is noticeable that this consensus does not
find very strong correspondence in policy efforts.
All three countries have more or less successful
educational policies, and progress in educating the
poor has been reported. However, the spectacular
results one could expect from the consensual prior-
ity accorded to education are not forthcoming. In
relative terms, educational policies in South Africa
have been more successful in improving the lot of
the poor than in Brazil (Lam 1998).
It should also be recalled that the consensual pref-
erence for educational policies may entail different
expectations with regards to distributive measures.
Thus, as Hossain and Moore observe, elites in
Bangladesh tend to see education primarily as an
empowering mechanism. In their view, the edu-
cated poor become conscious of their power poten-
tial and realise there are alternative forms of action
for overcoming poverty Therefore, self-awareness
and autonomy are the major values these elites
attribute to educating the poor.
For the Brazilian elites, priority on public invest-
ments in education is perceived as a kind of pain-
less solution to poverty. They tend to perceive
education as the efficient non-zero sum solution:
through education everyone may grow richer with-
out redistribution. Brazilian elites believe everyone
should have equal opportunity to reap the fruits of
development. But they are not willing to accept that
in order to establish equal conditions, you might
have to offer special conditions to those who have
been persistently impaired so they are effectively
able to compete. Thus, while there is widespread
recognition tht blacks and women are discrimi-
nated against, the elites are not prepared to accept
affirmative action in either case, arguing that posi-
tive discrimination would impair equality Nor are
the elites personally committed to improving edu-
cation. And if one takes into account the fact that
there is a deficit in the supply of schools, both in
elementary and secondary education, it becomes
clear that indeed the lack of will to meet the prob-
lem is a fact.
Social segmentation in the terms discussed by Kalati
and Manor is a more complex issue in comparisons
across countries. Actually, just what sort of segmen-
tation is more conducive to supporting anti-poverty
measures is hard to say For one thing, both univer-
salistic and particulanstic loyalties may be said to
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create obstacles to effective social policies. Thus,
Kalati and Manor indicate that the broad national
identity of South African elites makes them very
distant from the poor, relative to the Bangladeshi
elites, who have a sense of moral responsibility
towards those who are worse off within their much
more restricted social segment.
Yet, personal responsibility towards one's clan' does
not necessarily imply that a sense of urgency should
be conferred upon social policy In their analysis,
Hossain and Moore arrive at a conclusion that the
elites in Bangladesh do not perceive poverty as an
urgent issue per se. While it is true that the elites
have a benign attitude towards the poor, they tend
to favor long-term solutions, and even to extend the
problem of poverty to encompass other national
priorities.
The broader and less sharply defined lines of seg-
mentation that characterise South Africa vis-à-vis
Bangladesh may contribute to reducing the sense of
personal responsibility felt by elite people, but on
the other hand they make it more feasible to estab-
lish a national project that sets reduction of poverty
and inequality as a goal. In the peculiar political cir-
cumstance of South Africa, a national project plays
a strategic role in promoting anti-poverty measures.
As Kalati and Manor correctly observe, although
poor economic performance may hamper the mys-
tique of nationalism, for the time being national
development is a key element to ANC's legitimacy
and, I would add, to the enforcement of welfare
measures. That South Africa does better than Brazil
in reducing the educational gap between both black
and white and between poor and rich has to be
explained in part as a direct consequence of the
challenge there to build a new nation.
It may be true, as many have observed, that the
nation-state is an outdated phenomenon, and that
nationalism as an ideology is quickly losing ground
in the globalised world. But is it also true that where
national ideals are still powerful, it is easier to
mobilise collective solidarity to promote policies that
fight poverty That is to say in principle, where a
stronger feeling of nation is at play, there seems to be
greater sensibility to poverty and inequality issues.
The fate of the poor may be gloomier when neither
the national bond invoked by the ANC leadership
nor the direct tie to one's social segment observed in
Bangladesh plays an important role in framing the
elites' agenda. This is perhaps the case of Brazil,
where, despite the elites' high sensitivity to social
problems, no active commitment to a social policy
agenda develops.
Are we to conclude then that, in the absence of
strong national or primordial communitarian iden-
tities, we should not expect elites to be willing to
support the fight against poverty? Perhaps one way
out of such a fatalistic trap is to look at elite values
not as fixed, residual essences but as variables
which interact with their actual interests. The inter-
play between values and interests makes it possible
to understand why European elites have in the past
ended up embracing collective solutions in con-
fronting the negative externalities of poverty
It is true that elites in the less developed world
today do not experience the same kind of threats
that the Europeans did. Thus, neither contagious
diseases, nor political rebellion - some of the nega-
tive consequences European elites feared most -
appear to be relevant in the discourse of the three
national elites compared here. Realistically, they
know that advances in public health have consider-
ably reduced the danger of epidemic diseases. They
also know that under the present political circum-
stances revolutionary upheavals are very unlikely
However, as observed in Brazil and South Africa,
elites in many countries today do fear private vio-
lence and are likely to invest in personal safety
What will make them opt for collective instead of
individual alternatives against violence and crimi-
nality? The search for answers to such a question is
paramount today if one's objective is to arrive at
effective social policies. What improves the chances
that elites will consider it worthwhile, for whatever
reasons, to improve the lot of the poor? What raises
their stakes in anti-poverty measures?
Is this quest for interest motivation a denial of the
relevance of cultural values and attitudes? Not at all.
I believe that instead of positing values and interests
as mutually exclusive ways of understanding
motives for action andíor inaction, it is more pro-
ductive to see them both as interests. That is to say,
ideals or values as well as material concerns consti-
tute powerful motivational components that lead
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people to act. Therefore, we avoid the trap of pos-
ing ideals and norms, on the one hand, and rational
interests, on the other, as alternative explanations
for human behaviour (Weber 1967; Bendix 1962).
Looking at the interplay of pragmatic concerns
and ideals improves our ability to understand why
certain policy initiatives find support while others
do not, or why some succeed and others fail. As
with any other policies, measures to combat
poverty have to be both efficient and legitimate if
they are to be successful. And legitimacy is always
built on values, norms, and other components of
social perceptions.
Discussing the views of elites in Bangladesh, Brazil,
and South Africa, there is no doubt that the con-
crete environment they experience does affect their
respective images of poverty and inequality But that
does not necessarily lead to the mechanical conclu-
sion that their values and beliefs are mere reflec-
tions of the structures they live with. Nor is one
forced to accept the opposite orthodoxy, meaning
that culture and ideology create reality, when
acknowledging that the different perceptions of
poverty expressed by distinct national elites derive
to some extent from much deeper differences in
their world views.
The fact that, for example, one could work with the
hypothesis that the greater personal responsibility
for the poor observed in Bangladesh, relative to
Brazil and South Africa, is rooted in basic values of
Muslim civilisation does not rule out the fact that
the weak degree of stateness there leaves room for a
preference for voluntary anti-poverty action. In the
same sense, to state that the Brazilian elites prefer
authority initiatives to solidarity measures to coun-
teract poverty reveals Latin cultural values as much
as it reveals the reality of concrete market interests.
As De Swaan (1988) observed, historically the rise of
welfare policies in Western Europe can be interpreted
as the combined result of decisions made by ratio-
nally oriented elites to protect themselves against
public evils', plus the active engagement of morally
committed ideologues. It would certainly constitute a
significant advance if we could identity equivalent
combinations of ideological and pragmatic concerns
that would maximise the chances of success in
reducing poverty in contemporary societies.
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